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Abstract—The paper presents Relation Based Access Control
RelBAC, a model and a logic for access control which models
communities, possibly nested, and resources, possibly organized
inside complex file systems, as lightweight ontologies, and permis-
sions as relations between subjects and objects. RelBAC allows
us to represent expressive access control rules beyond the current
state of the art, and to deal with the strong dynamics of subjects,
objects and permissions which arise in Web 2.0 applications (e.g.
social networks). Finally, as shown in the paper, using RelBAC,
it becomes possible to reason about access control policies and, in
particular to compute candidate permissions by matching subject
ontologies (representing their interests) with resource ontologies
(describing their characteristics).
I. INTRODUCTION
Internet business patterns such as B2B, B2C, C2C are no
longer high-tech terminologies but, rather, they represent ev-
eryday activities involving virtually everybody from producers
to end customers. Businesses exchange information in addition
to products via B2B networks; they sell products to customers
via B2C networks and customers can even sell their own stuff
to one another through C2C interaction patterns. Furthermore,
customers are now able to provide feedbacks for quality and
service; sales managers of large companies can distribute
advertisements about new products or special offers to the
vendors; service companies are able to publish new services
through these online media; and so on. Thanks to the Web
2.0, eBusiness can enrich the traditional vending pattern with
more active involvement of the involved actors.
However, Web 2.0 applications present new challenges for
access control that can be exemplified as follows:
• The access control system must be capable of protect-
ing various kinds of objects in largely different scales,
possibly organized in complex directory structures.
• Permissions, access control rules and policies should be
defined relatively independently so that the evolution of
the social network has minimal impact on access control
policies.
• Manual rule creation and management are time-
consuming and error-prone to the exponentially increas-
ing complexity of the knowledge base.
RelBAC (for Relation Based Access Control) is a new model
and a logic which has been introduced in [1] with the overall
goal of dealing with the problem on access control in Web 2.0
applications. The first key feature of RelBAC is that its access
control models can be designed using entity-relationship (ER)
diagrams. As such, they can be seamlessly integrated into the
whole system and vary according to the scale of the business.
The second feature, which motivates the name RelBAC, is
that permissions can be modeled as relations, and differently
from the state of the art, e.g., RBAC [2], they can be manip-
ulated as independent objects, thus achieving the requirements
of modularity and flexibility described above.
In this paper we take a step further and show how, using
RelBAC, social networks and object organizations can be
modeled as lightweight ontologies (as defined in [3]), by ex-
ploiting the translation from classifications and Web directories
to lightweight ontologies described in [4]. This in turn allows
us to model permissions as Description Logic (DL) roles [5],
access control rules as DL formulas, and policies as sets of DL
formulas and, therefore, to reason about access control simply
by using off-the shelf DL reasoners, thus addressing the last
requirement described above.
The paper is organized as follows. Section II gives the
model and the logic of RelBAC, Section III describes the
usage of lightweight ontology in RelBAC, Section IV shows
the reasoning with lightweight ontologies, Section V lists the
related work and we conclude in Section VI.
II. RelBAC : RELATION BASED ACCESS CONTROL
A. The model
The RelBAC model can be represented as an ER Diagram
with the following components:
• SUBJECT (or USER): it is a set of subjects that intend
to access some resources. ‘IS-A’ relations exist between
sets of subjects. The largest subject set is the collection
of all the possible subjects.
• OBJECT: it is a set of objects or resources that subjects
intend to access. ‘IS-A’ relations exist between sets of
objects. The largest object set is the collection of all the
possible objects of the system.
• PERMISSION: it is allows an operation that subjects can
perform on objects, denoted by the name of the operation
it refers to, e.g., Write or Read. A PERMISSION is a
relation between SUBJECT and OBJECT, namely a set of
(subject, object) pairs. ‘IS-A’ relation also exist between
permissions.
• RULE (short for ACCESS CONTROL RULE): it
associates a PERMISSION to a specific set of
(SUBJECT,OBJECT) pairs which assigns the specific
SUBJECT the access right named by the PERMISSION
onto the specific OBJECT. Rules are formalized as DL
formulas, as described in the following subsection.
B. The Logic
The ER model of RelBAC can be directly expressed
in DL. In general, SUBJECTs, and OBJECTs are formal-
ized as concepts and PERMISSIONs are formalized as DL
roles1. Individual SUBJECTs and OBJECTs are formalized
as instances and PERMISSIONs are pairs of instances i.e.
(SUBJECT, OBJECT). RULEs express the kind of access
rights that SUBJECTs have on OBJECTs and are formalized
as the subsumption axioms provided below. In Rules 6 and 12,
we abbreviate ∀¬P.¬O as ∀O.P , which allows us to assign a
permission P to all objects in O. Thus, we may have a single
subject ‘u’ having access to a single object (Rule 7), to some
objects (Rule 8), to only the objects in O (Rule 9), to minimum
or maximum n objects (Rules 10 and 11), or to all objects in
a set O (Rule 12). Dual arguments can be given for any set of
users ‘U ’ by looking at the rules on the left (Rule 1 - 6). We
call these rules user-centric, as they allow us to assign users
fine-grained permissions such as those listed above. Dually, we
can define corresponding object-centric rules by replacing U,
O, P, u, o respectively with O, U, P−1, o, u. This feature, not
discussed here for lack of space, is however quite important
in terms of access control as it allows to design policies from
different perspectives.
U v P : o (1)
U v ∃P.O (2)
U v ∀P.O (3)
U v≥ nP.O (4)
U v≤ nP.O (5)
U v ∀O.P (6)
(P : o)(u) (7)
(∃P.O)(u) (8)
(∀P.O)(u) (9)
(≥ nP.O)(u) (10)
(≤ nP.O)(u) (11)
(∀O.P )(u) (12)
From the above, RelBAC shows a rich set of policy styles,
which is even more articulated with the object-centric rules
as described in [6]. In practice, the most commonly used
assignments are the first and the last, which resemble the only
two kinds of assignments allowed in RBAC. Subsumption is
not only used to express access control RULEs but also used to
represent the partial order ‘≥’ among subjects, among objects
and among permissions. The ordering relation ‘≥’ translates
the ‘IS-A’ relation in the RelBAC model and it allows us to
build inheritance hierarchies among subjects, objects and per-
missions. Inheritance is a very valuable property as it largely
simplifies the otherwise very complex task of administration
[2]. We define ‘≥’ as follows:
Ui ≥ Uj iff Ui v Uj (13)
Oi ≥ Oj iff Oi v Oj (14)
Pi ≥ Pj iff Pi v Pj (15)
1A DL role is a binary relation, not to be confused with a ‘role’ of the
RBAC model.
Fig. 1. Permission Assignment on Lightweight Ontologies
III. LIGHTWEIGHT ONTOLOGIES FOR ACCESS CONTROL
With the communication simplified by the development of
Internet, social activities such as online forums and blogs
greatly increase the number and type of relations in a social
network: not only traditional relations like ‘knows’, ‘is-a-
friend-of’, etc. but new terms such as ‘shares-photo-with’ or
‘comments-on-blog’. In another perspective, people are famil-
iar with tree-like structures such as the file systems of their
computers, their email directories, classifications, catalogs, and
so on. In general, there is a widespread tendency towards
organizing resources in tree-like structures. The key feature
underlying the success of tree-like directories is that one can
easily find something according to the property that, the deeper
a category is in a tree, the more specific resources it will con-
tain. Thus, community access control can be implemented in
RelBAC with the subjects, objects and permissions encoded
into different lightweight ontologies. Our solution is, therefore
to translate, with no or very little user intervention, these
tree-like knowledge structures into lightweight ontologies. We
achieve this goal by exploiting the ideas described in [7], in
which the authors show how a classification or a Web directory
can be automatically translated into a lightweight ontology.
Any classification or directory where each category is labeled
with a natural language name expressing its contents, can be
translated into a lightweight ontology according to two main
steps, as follows:
1) The label of each node is transformed into a propo-
sitional DL formula using natural language processing
(NLP) techniques. For example, a label ‘Soccer Fan’ is
transformed into ‘SocceriuFanj’ where the superscript
i(j) stands for the ith (jth) meaning of the word in a
reference dictionary (e.g., WordNet).
2) Each node is associated a formula, called the concept at
node, which is the conjunction of the formulas of all the
nodes on the path from the root to the node itself. For
example, a node labeled ‘Soccer Fan’ will be labeled
with ‘Friendk uSocceriuFanj’. The concept at node
univocally defines the ‘meaning of that node’, namely,
the set of documents which can be classified under it.
The result of the two steps above is a lightweight ontology
where each node is labeled with its concept at node and where
each concept at node is subsumed by the concepts of all
the nodes above. This property allows for automated object
classification and query answering. People will keep seeing
Fig. 2. Scattered Permissions to a Lightweight Ontology
and managing a classification but all their operations will
be supported and (partially) automated via the background
reasoning operating on the underlying lightweight ontology.
This background ontology has the same (tree-like) structure as
the original classification, but it makes explicit, with its ‘IS-A’
hierarchy, all the originally implicit and ambiguous relations
between object categories. This substantially contributes to
address the access control problem. More concretely, some
advantages are:
• Objects can be automatically classified into the proper
directories with the help of a DL reasoner. By exploiting
the ideas described in [7] it becomes possible to easily
add the vast amount of new information to the proper
categories with the proper access rules;
• The evolution of the object ontology (e.g., addition or
deletion of a category) is much more under control
because it must satisfy the underlying ontological seman-
tics;
• With the partial order formalized as in Section II-B, the
permissions on an object category will propagate up the
tree without extra policies (discussed more in Section IV).
Considerations similar to those provided for object ontologies
apply also to subject ontologies. As mentioned above, these
ontologies can be used to organize access to the underlying
(possibly very messy) social network. There are however two
further important considerations. The first is that RelBAC
subject lightweight ontologies closely resemble RBAC role
hierarchies [2]. They are however easier to manage as users
and permissions are totally decoupled. The second is that
the links across subjects in a social network, can be used to
suggest candidate paths for permission propagation. One such
small example is depicted in Figure 1.
Finally, the translation into a lightweight ontology can be
applied also to permission hierarchies. Notice that natural
language labels have been translated into DL formulas. The
terms on the left of Figure 2 are meant to provide evidence of
how the step from natural language to logic allows us to orga-
nize otherwise sparse categories. Notice how the lightweight
ontology in Figure 2 is upside down with respect the object
and subject ontologies presented before. In particular the top
category is the most powerful and less populated (in the sense
that it is the one satisfied by the smallest number of subject
object pairs). This notation is quite common in access control
and it satisfies the intuition that the categories corresponding
to the highest number of permissions should be put at the top
of the hierarchy.
IV. REASONING ABOUT ACCESS CONTROL RULES
The management and administration of access control with
complex subject, object and permission structures are quite
challenging and error-prone. In RelBAC, by exploiting the
translation into lightweight ontologies described in Section III,
these activities can be strongly supported by providing tools
(i.e., DL reasoners) which automate much (if not all) of the
reasoning about access control such as design time ontology
consistency checking, permission propagation management,
separation of duties, etc. Some examples of reasoning are:
Design Time Consistency Checking It is almost impossible
to check manually a large access control knowledge base, not
to say further integration of multiple knowledge bases. The
reasoning service of RelBAC offers consistency checking
such as to check if S ∪ P |= ⊥, where S,P stand for the
knowledge bases corresponding to the state description and
policy description. If the answer is negative, the knowledge
base is consistent.
Permission Propagation An advantage of the hierarchy
formalized as ‘IS-A’ relations through subjects, objects and
permissions provide ‘free’ permission propagation by the
reasoning. For example, in the predefined knowledge base we
know ‘Bob is a business friend’, ‘write is more powerful than
read’, ‘laptop is a subset of digital device’. Thus we can reason
the permission propagation as {Bussiness(Bob),Write v
Read, Laptop v Digital, Business v ∀Digital.Write} |=
(∀Digital.Write)(Bob).
Separation of Duties (SoD) To enforce that some permis-
sions should not be assigned to some users at the same time is
the basic idea of SoD. For example, ‘customers should not be
allowed to read and update some category, say Player’. And it’s
straight forward to be secured by a rule in the knowledge base
as (Update : Player) u (Read : Player) u Customer v ⊥.
Access Control Decision At run time, the access control
system will face various of access control requests and make
decisions at real-time. RelBAC turns a request into a formula
and put it to the reasoner and then the reasoner will check
whether it is consistent with the knowledge base. A positive
answer means that the request is acceptable, otherwise should
be denied.
However the fact that we handle subject, object and per-
mission hierarchies as lightweight ontologies allows us to
deal with the problem of semantic heterogeneity, namely
with the fact that in general we will have multiple subject
and/or object and/or permission hierarchies which express
semantically related notions in many different forms. This
problem has been addressed as semantic matching in [8]. In the
domain of access control this problem becomes quite relevant
as we see two kinds of applications of the semantic matching
techniques.
1) Two hierarchies of the same kind such as two subject
hierarchies, two object permission hierarchies, etc.
2) One subject and one object hierarchy. We found that
there exists similarity between the subject and object
lightweight ontology although they are heterogeneous
ontologies built independently.
Let’s go back to Figure 1, it shows parts of the lightweight
ontologies built on two hierarchies, one subject and one object.
On the left, David is classified as an instance of the set
‘Friend3 u Business7 u Product1 u Apple3’ according to
his social position that he has a Business7 relation with
Alice and he works for Apple3 (which is an IT company
rather than a fruit). On the right, there’s a class of objects
‘Sale2 u Digital3 u Laptop1 u MacBook1’ where Sale2
is a branch of Business7, MacBook1 is a Laptop1 as
a Product1 of Apple3. Apparently the two concepts are
different in labels, but semantically overlapping.
To detect semantic relations between lightweight ontologies,
we use S-Match as described in [8]. The original idea is to
calculate the semantic similarity such as equal, overlapping,
etc. between the categories of the two given classifications,
such as the subject, object or permission hierarchies, when two
organization integrates and verify that some desired properties
(i.e. SOD) still hold.
V. RELATED WORK
Classic access control techniques, e.g., cryptography have
been proposed for community access control such as [9],
[10]. Such systems focus on protection from security threats
rather than taking use of the rich information from the web.
Lockr[11] was proposed to fit the situation that the large num-
ber of content sharing systems and sites use different access
control methods un-reusable for each other. It separates social
networking information from the content sharing mechanisms,
so that end users do not have to maintain several site-specific
copies of their social networks. It also provides a way to use
social relationships as an important attribute, relationship type,
to define access control rules.
Another series of research focus on providing policy lan-
guages for the rich semantics on the web. Yague et al. in
[12] even presented a model named Semantic Based Access
Control. The model is based on the semantic properties of the
resources, clients (users), contexts and attribute certificates and
relies on the rich expressiveness of the attributes to create and
validate access control policies. Dimiani et al. proposed in
[13] to exploit context information in Web-based environment
access control, the context information formalized in DL
can be used as preconditions of RelBAC rules. Pan et al.
present a middle-ware based system [14] to use semantics
in access control based on the RBAC model [2] with a
mediator to translate the access request between organizations
by replacing roles and objects with matched roles and matched
objects. They used semantic mapping on roles in order to
find the similarity or separation of duties between roles in
two ontologies. We do further as the S-Match tools are more
generic and can match a subject ontology with an object
ontology in order to suggest new rules.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper we have presented RelBAC, a new model
and logic for access control. The main feature of RelBAC
is that it allows to organize users and objects as (lightweight)
ontologies and that it models permissions are relations. This
in turn allows to represent access control rules and policies
as DL formulas and therefore to reason about them using
state of the art off-the-shelf reasoners. In turn, as shown
in the second part of the paper, this allows us to match,
using the semantic matching technology, the user and the
object ontologies and, as a consequence, to generate (semi-
)automatically permissions which (may) fit the user interests.
The idea is that these permissions are then proposed to the
administrator as suggestions to be confirmed and approved.
REFERENCES
[1] F. Giunchiglia, R. Zhang, and B. Crispo, “Relbac: Relation based access
control,” in International Conference on Semantics, Knowledge and
Grid, SKG 2008, I. C. Society, Ed., 2008.
[2] D. F. Ferraiolo, R. S. Sandhu, S. I. Gavrila, D. R. Kuhn, and R. Chan-
dramouli, “Proposed NIST standard for role-based access control,”
Information and System Security, vol. 4, no. 3, pp. 224–274, 2001.
[3] F. Giunchiglia and I. Zaihrayeu, Encyclopedia of Database Systems.
Verlag, Springer, June 2009, no. 978-0-387-35544-3, ch. Lightweight
Ontologies.
[4] F. Giunchiglia, M. Marchese, and I. Zaihrayeu, “Encoding classifications
into lightweight ontologies.” in ESWC, 2006, pp. 80–94.
[5] F. Baader, D. Calvanese, D. L. McGuinness, D. Nardi, and P. F. Patel-
Schneider, Eds., The description logic handbook: theory, implementa-
tion, and applications. New York, NY, USA: Cambridge University
Press, 2003.
[6] R. Zhang, Relation Based Access Control. Netherlands: IOS Press,
2010.
[7] F. Giunchiglia, M. Marchese, and I. Zaihrayeu, “Towards a theory of for-
mal classification,” in CandO 2005,AAAI-05, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania,
USA, 2005.
[8] F. Giunchiglia, M. Yatskevich, and P. Shvaiko, “Semantic matching:
Algorithms and implementation.” J. Data Semantics, vol. 9, pp. 1–38,
2007. [Online]. Available: http://dblp.uni-trier.de/db/journals/jods/jods9.
html\#GiunchigliaYS07
[9] B. Carminati and E. Ferrari, “Privacy-aware collaborative access
control in web-based social networks.” in DBSec, ser. Lecture Notes
in Computer Science, V. Atluri, Ed., vol. 5094. Springer, 2008,
pp. 81–96. [Online]. Available: http://dblp.uni-trier.de/db/conf/dbsec/
dbsec2008.html\#CarminatiF08
[10] B. Carminati, E. Ferrari, R. Heatherly, M. Kantarcioglu, and
B. Thuraisingham, “A semantic web based framework for social
network access control,” Proceedings of the 14th ACM symposium
on Access control models and technologies SACMAT 09, pp. 177–
186, 2009. [Online]. Available: http://portal.acm.org/citation.cfm?doid=
1542207.1542237
[11] A. Tootoonchian, K. K. Gollu, S. Saroiu, Y. Ganjali, and A. Wolman,
“Lockr: social access control for web 2.0,” in WOSP ’08: Proceedings
of the first workshop on Online social networks. New York, NY, USA:
ACM, 2008, pp. 43–48.
[12] M. I. Y. del Valle, M. del Mar Gallardo, and A. Mana, “Semantic
access control model: A formal specification,” in ESORICS, ser.
LNCS, S. D. C. di Vimercati, P. F. Syverson, and D. Gollmann,
Eds., vol. 3679. Springer, 2005, pp. 24–43. [Online]. Available:
http://dblp.uni-trier.de/db/conf/esorics/esorics2005.html\#ValleGM05
[13] E. Damiani, D. Capitani, C. Fugazza, and P. Samarati, “Extending
context descriptions in Semantics-Aware access control,” 2006, pp.
162–176. [Online]. Available: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/11961635\ 11
[14] C.-C. Pan, P. Mitra, and P. Liu, “Semantic access control for information
interoperation,” in SACMAT ’06: Proceedings of the eleventh ACM
symposium on Access control models and technologies. New York,
NY, USA: ACM, 2006, pp. 237–246.
